Guest Post by Neil Clack
UPDATE: I owe Neil an apology. I forgot to put his name to this article when it was put up. More haste, less speed, as my mother used to day. I’m very sorry.
Be honest. Who thought at the time Stewart Downing was not a good signing for West Ham? Many of us felt we desperately needed another striker with the last of that summer’s transfer budget, rather than spend the 5 million on a 29-year-old underperforming winger. David Sullivan even went public, wishing to make it perfectly clear that the signing of Downing was Sam’s decisión, and not the board’s – it looked like the beginning of some tension between the two men (one that manifested itself last May when the owners deliberated over whether to sack Sam or not – personally, I reckon the reports that they were divided, with Sullivan wanting him out, and Gold and Brady sticking up for the manger are not far from the truth).
It was a gamble by Sam, putting all the eggs in one Andy Carroll-laden basket, and it nearly cost us relegation, but we survived, and are now reaping the benefits of the multi-functional Downing, and finally having a big squad – we’ve gone from one extreme to the other as far as striking options are concerned!
And what a revelation Downing is proving to be, in his new position at the point of the diamond in a 4-3-1-2 formation. It makes you wonder if perhaps he’s been held back all his career, stuck out wide by Steve McClaren, Martin O’Neill, and Kenny Dalglish in rigid 4-4-2 systems. Brendan Rodgers even had him playing at left back! (Downing had 0 goals and 0 assists in the season before we signed him!)
Downing’s delivery of corners and free kicks has been superb lately too. How is it that by playing in a new position, a player even manages to deliver better set pieces? – it can only be confidence and momentum, I guess?
The diamond formation, as it’s dubbed in England, requires a ‘number 10’ at the point of the diamond, with the other three midfielders tucked in more central. Downing has thrived in this role. The width is provided by the two forwards, and, of course, the number 10, who pull out wide whenever they feel it’s required, and that calls for a good understanding between the three of them, aswell as a good reading of the game. Downing, Sakho, and Valencia pulled it off to a tee in the home victories over Liverpool and Man City.
When Sakho went wide, either to the left or the right, Valencia moved into the centre more, and vice-versa. At times, it can look as if you’re playing without a centre forward, and then suddenly you have 3 in the centre forward position – a nightmare for central defenders, especially for some British defenders, who haven’t been brought up to face such mobility.
In the diamond formation, the full backs, with no wide midfielders/wingers in front of them, also have a lot more room to push forward and link up with the forwards or the number 10 down the wing, and that’s why the formation can be a very attacking one – full backs playing almost like wing backs.
Some of us wondered whether And Carroll would fit into 4-3-1-2; whether he had enough tactical nous or mobility to pull out into those wide areas and open up the space in the middle for the number 10 to move into, and it was noticable that when Carroll first returned, against Newcastle, Sam changed the system. playing Jarvis and Downing on the wings.
And it was very much 4-4-2 first half at West Brom – the Carroll/Zarate partnership clearly needs a bit of working on – and then we went 3-5-2 in the second half (or 5-3-2 more like) to stem the flow as West Brom began to over-run our Song & Noble-less central midfield.
The great thing about the win over Swansea last Sunday though, is that even with Carroll in the team, we successfully played the diamond formation and continued to get the best out of Downing, while also playing to Carroll’s strengths.
Carroll’s never looked that great on the floor, but in the air, he’s probably one of the best in the world at the moment? As long as we don’t become dependent on the long ball upto Carroll then having that option is fine. Geoff Hurst, David Cross and John Hartson were also great in the air, but played in good West Ham passing teams – the ball in the air was just one option. Carroll can also take heart that both Hurst and Cross improved immensely as all-round players during their time at West Ham.
Jacob Steinberg, the Guardian’s West Ham correspondent, described the way the team played, and Allardici’s tactics, as thoroughly modern after the win v Man City. He s right in terms of British football, although 4-3-2-1 has been the main formation used in Argentina, and also often in Italy, Spain, and Germany too, for the last 30 years. As Steinburg pointed out, at times, it looks like the team is playing without strikers, such is the interchanging, roaming, and pulling out wide of the front free. That’s the beauty of the system.
With three central midefielders behind him, the player at the point of the diamond is not required to track back as much as midfielders in 4-4-2, something which British fans have had problems understanding, or adjusting too – the number 10 is the thinking player, the one who should be postioning himself as an outlet when his team are not in possession, ready to receive the ball when they regain it, in any space he sees opening up, rather than thinking about defensive duties.
The problem with the defintion of the ‘Number 10’ position in England is that, unlike other countries, British football vernacular has never had a proper name for the role, mainly because the position never really existed here until recently. Some pundits, wrongly in my opinión, refer to 2nd strikers like Rooney or Sheringham as playing in the number 10 position, but that’s not what we’re talking about here.
Abroad, it’s a clearly defined role, the attacking midfielder, at the point of the diamond, who playes in a free role. It got dubbed ‘number 10’ in other countries because invariably those players, like Riquelme, Baggio, Totti, Socrates, Zico, Zidane tended to wear that shirt, but there are proper terms for the position abroad eg, ‘Enganche’ in Spanish, ‘Trequartista’ in Italian, which are as much part of their football parlance as full back or centre forward.
One wonders how much English players like John Barnes and Chris Waddle were held back, especially at international level, where they were pigeon-holed as wingers, and instructed to stick to the flanks?
In 1991, England manager Graham Taylor said he had sat down with Barnes, and was fascinated by his knowledge of international football. Barnes had pointed out that all the most skillful and creative players at international level operated from more central positions, so, as a result, Taylor tried Barnes in the number 10 role for a friendly v USSR in May 91, but he reverted back to 4-4-2 at half time, and never varied from it again, claiming the rest of the team didn’t understand what was required.
Waddle, as a radio pundit, has always been scathing in his criticisms of English football, especially the national team. He found a new lease of life, playing in the number 10 role at Marseille, and has been ranting away about the inflexibility of British football, and British managers, ever since.
No one could deny that Joe Cole’s career hasn’t been a success (Premier league titles, Fa Cup and Carling Cup winners medals, 56 England caps), but personally I think he was unlucky in that his main managers, at the peak of his career, at both club and international level (Mourinho, Eriksson, Hodgson, were all defensive-minded, who saw him as a left midfielder, requiring him to change his natural game and track back. If Joe Cole had been in Argentinian, he would have been give the number 10 shirt, and told to dribble and roam wherever he sees fit. I still can’t help feeling that Joe Cole could have been an even greater player than he was.
(There’s an article on Joe Cole by Sam Wallace in the Independent here, in which Cole himself says he always felt his best position was in the centre).
Who wouldn’t have liked to have been a fly on the wall, during those discussions between Sam and the board back in May. I would have loved to have heard the tactical debate; how they proposed to provide the fans with more attacking and entertaining football this season, but I doubt there are any of us who envisaged the result would be 4-3-1-2, with Downing at the point of the diamond?
Whether it happened by plan or accident – I think the late signing of Song on the last day of the transfer window, to add to Kayoute & Noble in central midfield, providing a platform for the number 10 to perform, has facilitated the system enormously – credit must be given to Sam Allardidi, that most thoroughly sophisticated of modern managers.
And what a great signing Downing has turned out to be. A bargain for 5 million!